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| National defense council: A veteran’s views - Jul 22, 2008 |
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By Dilip Rayamajhi
We need a system that can evaluate the threats so that we can adopt preventive defense.
The amendment in the composition of the National Defense Council(NDC) as per Article 145 of the interim constitution was the major issue put forward by the Nepali Congress and the Madheshi Forum last week as one of the precondition to clear the impasse that has padlocked the formation of new government in Nepal.
They were keen that the leader of the opposition party be included as a member of the council which at the moment comprises of the prime minister, the defense minister, the home minister and three other ministers to be nominated by the prime minister. The move suffered a defeat, but the debate will not end here. The media reported that this issue was raised keeping in view the role of the council with the Maoist at the helm of power in the integration of the Maoists combatants.
Although in the time of writing this article a more complicated precondition has risen up, the issues of amending the composition of the NDC may further aggravate the existing internecine. In addition, the ensuing debates and rebuttals on the issue depicts that the relationship of the functional aspects of Nepal Army (NA) with the governing system of the country is as important as it was in the past.
As the constituent assembly will exercise its own wisdom on issues of sensitive nature, the neutral citizens or the man on the street need to understand what it is all about? Does it merit so much fuss or are such issues raised just to create hurdles? Or are the politicians dwelling about the cart before the horse or the horse before the cart? To answer these questions, one needs to take a journey into the past to understand the evolvement of NDC, its functions in the past and its necessity for the future.
I was one of the staff that was instrumental in planning the creation of the NDC when it was evolved in the 1990 constitution and also in evolving it’s secretariat at a later date. Having retired recently from active service in the NA and not bound by any censorship or restrictions, I would like to share my viewpoints remaining within the limitations set by my professional code of conduct, my obligations towards institutional security and my moral ethos.
With the advent of multiparty democracy, formulating a system to control and to use the army was one of the key issues for a smooth transition in such a volatile environment induced by mob power. The seriousness of this volatility was amply proved when the bodies of couple of policemen tortured to death by a mob in Teku were paraded in a manual cart with the chief of police and the then home minister forced to lead the procession.
It was with the help of the army that the law and order was maintained by imposing curfew to curb the possible aftermath of violence. This incidence which threatened the continuation of a changed system in the country in its onset showed that the army would be required to maintain internal security. It also heralded an era where a cordial working relationship was mandatory between the head of the state and the then head of the interim government to use the army for maintaining internal peace and harmony.
However, the risk of setting precedence to use the army to maintain peace in minor strife and also to quell agitations launched by political adversaries loomed at large. It was up to the army to recommend a mechanism and procedure to prevent such endeavors and to focus only on issues affecting national security.
In addition, to remain neutral and apolitical in a situation where the alliance of convenience between the two major parties would break at any moment, the army had to be kept under the command of the neutral institution, the crown, the symbol of unity. However, to give the king absolute control of the army would not be accepted principally or politically in a multiparty democracy.
From the study of different models adopted in different parts of the world, the US National Security Council (US NSC) matched certain requirements that we were looking for especially in the organisational aspect and its position in the power hierarchy. However, the functional aspect had to be remodeled to suit our requirements.
While forming this remodeled version, in the initial stages of planning, the council with the prime minister as the chairman included the leader of the opposition, related cabinet ministers, ministerial secretaries and senior leadership of the army. Among them, the leader of the opposition was out rightly disapproved and later on the group was narrowed down to only three prominent figures, the prime minister, the defense minister and the army chief.
It was the political leadership of the time that disapproved the leader of the opposition with reasoning that it would be difficult to arrive at a consensus when the need rose to use the army. Certain sectors also felt that the opposition could be the adversary in an internal conflict scenario and in such a situation, with the opposition represented in the council, it would be difficult to fulfill its tasks.
The provision of the National Defense Council in the 1990 Constitution did fulfill the major objectives regarding the operation and the use of the army. However its functions could be affected advantageously or disadvantageously by a double linkage system within the related institutions. For example, the army chief had direct access to the king, the supreme commander, whom he could consult even before any agenda could be discussed in the NDC.
After his consultation with the king, he would discuss the issues with the defense minister. In similar lines, the prime minister could also discuss the agendas with the king and also his cabinet before the issues could be formally put up in the NDC. At times, this double linkage delegated the NDC as a rubber stamp or as a mere link in the official judicial procedure.
In terms of democratic norms, the provision and creation of NDC in the constitution limited the direct authority of the king in military affairs and with the prime minister as the chairman it was more compatible with article 35(2) in which the king could exercise his constitutional power only through the prime minister with the consent of the cabinet
Although the creation of NDC fulfilled the major objectives, it was not what the military planners, with their knowledge and expertise of strategic studies, had envisaged. We wanted the organisation to be more in the lines of the US NSC when it was the foremost entity in an advisory role in matters regarding national security issues.
Furthermore, the army wanted an institution that would advise the government in all security matters to prevent the risk to national security from such issues like the criminalization of politics and the possible dilution of sovereignty because of external intervention in political matters prevalent during the time. There was even disgruntlement within army circle when the English version of the constitution depicted it as National Defense Council instead of National Security Council.
Although the army was aware of certain risks to national security mainly because of the prevailing political culture, it could not assess at the time that the political follies would lead to a full scale insurgency. Even though warning signals were received of such possibilities from sketchy reports about some groups partaking militant training in remote parts of Karnali Zone before the onset of insurgency, it could not be validated because with the police in the helm of security matters such issues did not merit military scrutiny.
In addition, with the political leadership totally dependent on the police, any reports from the military were assumed to be viewed with skepticism and suspicion. These apathetic attitudes clearly showed that the country lacked an institution that could advise, coordinate and integrate all related bodies to safeguard national interests.
With the onset of insurgency in the country, without an unbiased integrated organisation to assess the situation in order to justify the use of military force, the decision to use the army was marred by accusations, political tussle and at times reluctances due to minimum criteria not being fulfilled for a successful counterinsurgency program because of lack of civil military coordination This was mainly due to the lack of knowledge among the political and civil leadership about military education and counterinsurgency program.
In order to minimise the affects of such discrepancies, the army recommended a secretariat for the NDC and was adamant that this be one of the prerequisites for its deployment. Even the late King Birendra was closely involved in the planning process of this organisation and it is interesting to note that the book on India’s defense policy by ex minister Mr. Jaswant Singh was used as reference. He had also recommended a similar organisation for India.
Such an organisation was not in the lines of a think tank. It would also not present predictions or estimates like an intelligence agency. It would advise the policy planners by presenting recommendations from facts deducted from the synthesis of information. Its information bank would be enriched by integrating the inputs received from the state, related institutions, other non governmental entities and think tanks.
It is also important to note that this organisation was not evolved to counter the prevailing insurgency. It was to be organised as a permanent focal institution to advise policy planners through NDC about national security and safeguarding national interests. Its legitimacy would be evoked by article 118 (4) of the 1990 Constitution.
Although ad hoc committees were formed when the army was initially deployed to provide security to development programs through the Internal Security and Development Program (ISDP), the NDC secretariat did not materialize during the reign of King Birendra. It was during the reign of King Gyanendra that the secretariat was formed.
However it did not match some of the objectives and criteria of the original concept. Firstly, the original composition had a civilian equivalent to secretary of the public service heading the organisation as the coordinator but when it was formed the post was given to the defense secretary. With an army two star general as his deputy, the secretariat turned into an extension of the defense ministry and the army headquarters more than an organisation as envisaged.
Secondly, as the time demanded, the secretariat focused more on intelligence gathering for the ongoing conflict and public relations through the use of media instead of focusing on strategic matters. In fact one friendly agency which was involved in infrastructural development concentrated on creating the secretariat into an integrated national intelligence organisation involving the three main security related agencies.
This writer is not in a position to know how the organisation is functioning at the moment but evaluation from past trends depict that it is still what it was during the time of internal conflict.
Today, in the interim constitution the NDC exists in a different form. However its functions are the same as in the 1990 constitution with the exception that the king’s authority has been replaced by the cabinet and certain time bound restrictive power has been delegated to the interim legislature regarding the mobilisation of the army.
Another difference is in the wordings. In the 1990 constitution the executive provision is “operate and use the army” (Sanchalan, prayog) whereas in the interim constitution it is “operate, mobilise and use the army” (sanchalan, parichalan, prayog).
I leave it to the legal experts to gauge out the implications of the difference in the wordings because use and mobilise are almost synonyms when it concerns the military. There is also an additional provision whereby the council can invite other individuals as required in the meetings.
One of the anomalies prominently noticeable in the composition of the present NDC is the omission of the army chief from its membership. This could be due to the existing sentiments against the military leadership. If this is the reason, then decisions need to be made rationally because without the army chief in the NDC it would be similar to ice cream without the cream. Beside his expertise, the post of the Chief of Army Staff is an institution by itself and needs to be given due recognition in matters of national security or military affairs.
His omission from the NDC will create a greater rift in the civil and military relationship which may lead to crisis of confidence. He cannot be relegated to an invited member with the prestigious authority that he holds in the army. Furthermore, with only ministers as members of the council, it will be just like a sub committee of the cabinet. This leads to a question whether we need the NDC in its present form.
If the functions of the NDC are to be carried out by only ministers then why waste time and create bureaucratic or judicial hurdle? Why not put up the matter directly to the council of ministers? There is no need for a control system. However, if in the new constitution, the authority to operate and use the army were to reside in the president or prime minister, then definitely the NDC should exist with the army chief as one of the prominent members and the secretariat needs to be developed to be able to generate necessary inputs.
If the authority to operate and use the army were to remain the same as in the interim constitution, instead of creating the NDC whose recommendations are mandatory for the council of ministers decisions regarding the army, a strong advisory body as elsewhere is required.
Reforming the present day secretariat of the NDC by making it more functional and delegating it as the authority on national security matters could be one of the processes. It could be given impetus by appointing an expert national security advisor with the equivalent rank of a minister as its head. It could also comprise of civilian experts and experts in uniform to further enhance the concept of integrated approach.
In a country like ours where adoption to the changes in the system like federalism may fuel strife and conflict as well as separatist movements, the center will require a strong deterrence factor which only the army can generate in the present circumstances.
A former secretary of defense of the United States of America, William Perry, correctly remarked that in almost every new democracy the military is a major force in domestic politics and that the US policy wants the military to come down on the side of democracy and economic reforms if a crisis occurs. He has also coined the term preventive defense which creates the condition that support peace, making war or conflict less likely, and deterrence unnecessary.
This holds true for Nepal. We need a system that can evaluate the threats so that we can adopt preventive defense. This is also an era where the world faces a cosmopolitan outlook and military matters will always be under the spotlight of the media and the scrutiny of the civil society as well as domestic and international lawyers. It is mandatory that our country prepares the necessary institutions and procedures to create a system for preventive defense and to justify the use of military in domestic conflicts if the need arises.
(The writer retired recently from the Nepal Army. He is a counterterrorism fellowship graduate of National Defense University Washington D.C. He can be reached at dj_rayamajhi @ hotmail.com)
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